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What Explains the Recent Calls for Reinstatement of a Tax Considered 
Unpopular? An Analysis of Graduated Tax in Uganda 
 
David Bakibinga, Jalia Kangave and Dan Ngabirano 
 
 
Summary 
 
Successful decentralisation relies heavily on the ability of subnational government to 
generate its own revenue. In many African countries, subnational government is authorised 
to collect a variety of taxes and user fees including trade licensing taxes, property taxes, 
market fees, garbage collection fees and road user fees. With the exception of property 
taxes, which have the potential to generate significant revenue, most other taxes collectively 
fund a very small proportion of subnational government budgets. Until recently, one of the 
main sources of own revenue for subnational government in Uganda was a poll tax known as 
graduated tax. Tanzania and Kenya had a similar tax, referred to respectively as the 
development levy and graduated personal tax. However, the tax was abolished in Kenya in 
1974, in Tanzania in 2003 and in Uganda in 2005. The reasons for abolishing the tax in the 
three countries were similar, and included the fact that it relied on coercive enforcement, the 
costs of collection were quite high and it disproportionately affected the poor. In Uganda, 
however, there have recently been calls – within and outside government – for the 
reintroduction of the tax. Our research seeks to answer the question: what explains the calls 
for the introduction of a tax that was largely unpopular? We find two main explanations. First, 
graduated tax was the main source of revenue for local government in Uganda and there has 
been no adequate replacement for it. Second, the tax was a symbol of pride for some men, 
and encouraged productivity. Women – particularly in rural areas – feel that its abolition 
reduced the productivity of men.  
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Introduction 
 
Three themes recur in the extensive literature on the financing of subnational government in 
anglophone sub-Saharan Africa. One is that subnational governments (with the exception of 
federal countries like Nigeria and Ethiopia) raise very little revenue themselves, and are 
therefore extremely dependent on whatever fiscal transfers they can obtain from higher 
levels of government, or, in earlier years, from aid donors (Fjeldstad 2016; IMF 2012; Jibao 
2009). The second is that the process of revenue-raising at the local level in many, if not 
most, African countries is characterised by a high degree of informality and coercion, with the 
result that the actual burden of taxation is often very unfairly distributed, and can be quite 
high on some taxpayers (Jibao et al. 2017; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Therkildsen 
2006). The third is that where central government has managed to abolish these rather 
coercively collected and inequitable taxes – as is the case with graduated tax in Uganda, 
Kenya and Tanzania – the outcome has been almost universally positive and welcomed 
(Fjelstad 2016; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). We are not here challenging the first two 
elements of this standard narrative. Indeed, we broadly accept them. We are, however, 
challenging the third element: the notion that the abolition of graduated tax in East Africa was 
unambiguously a good thing.  
 
Stimulated by reports that showed nostalgia for graduated tax among segments of Uganda’s 
population, we conducted research to establish the arguments for and against  reintroduction 
of the tax. Our research relied on two main methods. The first was a desk study of primary 
and secondary literature, including laws, government reports, newspaper articles, academic 
articles and other publications. The second was interviews with various stakeholders, 
including central government officials, local government officials, representatives from civil 
society organisations, chiefs and community members between late 2016 to mid-2017. Our 
fieldwork was conducted in eight districts, which we selected on the basis of their location 
and the yield from graduated tax before it was abolished.1 In each district we interviewed 
several local government officials and chiefs. We also held focus group discussions in three 
of the districts,. The interviews and focus group discussions were aimed at understanding the 
impact of the abolition of graduated tax on subnational government and citizens. In total, we 
interviewed forty local government officials – chief administrative officers, town clerks, 
treasurers, accountants, revenue officers, planners, finance officers and local council 
chairpersons. We also interviewed five chiefs and one prison officer. At the central 
government level, we spoke with officials from the Local Government Finance Commission 
(LGFC) and officers in the Tax Policy Department of the Ministry of Finance Planning and 
Economic Development. Similarly, we conducted four focus group discussions in three 
districts with a total of thirty-four participants. Lastly, we spoke with representatives from 
three civil society organisations: Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group, Uganda Debt 
Network, and Southern and Eastern African Trade, Information and Negotiations Institute 
(SEATINI).  
 
We found that there was considerable support for the reintroduction of graduated tax in some 
quarters. We also discovered that, unlike Kenya and Tanzania, the original decision to 
abolish graduated tax in Uganda was politically quite contentious, with a significant amount 
of support for its retention in the Ugandan Parliament. More specifically, there seem to be 
three sources of support for reintroducing the tax after its abolition: 
 
                                                            
1  We visited Kampala, Mbarara, Kabale, Kisoro, Gulu, Moroto, Kapchorwa and Tororo.  
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1. The majority of government officials at the subnational level would like the tax 
reintroduced. This is not surprising given the fact that they got a bad deal out of its 
abolition. 
2. Some women are in favour of its reintroduction. The basic grounds for this seem to be 
that they perceive graduated tax as a way of obliging lazy husbands to go to work. 
3. Perhaps more surprising, some men also retain nostalgia for the tax. On the face of it, 
this is difficult to explain on grounds of rational self-interest. However, it can be explained 
from the perspective of the social standing that was associated with having the financial 
resources to honour one’s tax obligations.  
 
We are conscious of the fact that our sample of interviewees is too small to be representative 
of the broader perceptions of Ugandans. There is a need for a much larger sample of 
participants to draw concrete policy conclusions. However, our research casts a spotlight on 
a narrative around the abolition of graduated tax that is largely ignored in existing literature: 
there are segments of the population who, for various reasons, are nostalgic for the tax.  
 
Our discussion is divided into four sections. In Section 1, we discuss in some detail the 
circumstances under which graduated tax was abolished in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda. 
This is followed in Section 2 by a discussion of the reasons behind the abolition of the tax. In 
Section 3, we examine why there are calls from certain segments in Uganda to have it 
reinstated. We conclude the discussion in Section 4.   
 
 
1  Abolition of graduated tax in East Africa 
 
Poll taxes (also known as head taxes) were introduced by colonialists in various parts of 
Africa, to supplement or replace colonial hut taxes (Gardner 2012). These taxes served two 
major purposes. On the one hand, they were a basic source of general government revenue 
used to sustain colonial administration and support war efforts (Waris 2007; Fjeldstad and 
Therkildsen 2008; Gardner 2012). On the other hand, taxation was used as an instrument to 
force Africans to work for wages for the colonial government and white settlers or to cultivate 
cash crops on their own land. Many African countries continued to levy these taxes even 
after independence. In many countries, however, poll taxes were handed over to subnational 
governments once central governments got other significant sources of revenue, such as 
income tax, value added tax, and excise and customs duties. Poll taxes constituted the main 
source of own revenue for many post-independent subnational governments. In Uganda, for 
example, until its abolition a poll tax known as graduated tax was the main source of own 
revenue for most subnational governments. Introduced by the British in 1954, graduated tax 
was intended to generate revenue for the day-to-day running and operations of the colonial 
administration (Vallibhoy 1965; Davey 1974). It was imposed on all able-bodied men over the 
age of eighteen (irrespective of whether or not they were engaged in gainful employment), 
and women in gainful employment. 
 
A similar tax, known as the development levy, existed in Tanzania to facilitate local 
development projects, including the construction of roads, schools and dispensaries (Kjaer 
and Katera 2017). In Kenya, a mass tax known as graduated personal tax was introduced in 
the late colonial period to serve a similar purpose (Waris 2007).  Kenya was the first of the 
three countries to completely abolish the tax. In 1973, the Minister of Finance proposed in 
parliament that graduated personal tax should be abolished on the grounds that there was a 
need to move away from direct taxation of poor members of society (Kenya National 
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Assembly 1973). There was huge support for the minister’s proposal because the tax was 
perceived as being regressive, its enforcement was coercive and it was sometimes used as 
an instrument of oppression by those in power (Kenya National Assembly 1973; Kwatemba 
2017; Tarus and Njoroge 2015).  
 
In Tanzania, the development levy (then simply known as the poll tax) was first abolished in 
1969, following mass public protests after thirteen people died in a prison that was 
overcrowded with tax defaulters (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). The tax was reintroduced 
in 1984, and was this time referred to as the development levy. It was finally abolished in 
2003. The decision to abolish the development levy was not discussed in parliament (Kjaer 
and Therkildsen 2013; World Bank 2006). Instead, the Minister of Finance announced in his 
2003 budget speech that the government was going to abolish the tax, because there had 
been complaints ‘from ordinary people and business entities on the nuisance caused by 
revenue collection’. Among the reasons for its abolition was the harsh enforcement, its 
regressive nature and the fact that the revenue collected was used largely to finance 
operational costs of local government instead of financing development projects (Fjeldstad 
and Semboja 2000; Kjaer and Therkildsen 2013).  
 
Unlike Kenya and Tanzania, in Uganda the government did not opt for an outright abolition of 
graduated tax. In April 2004, a member of parliament moved a motion to sponsor a private 
members’ Bill proposing the abolition of graduated tax (Parliament of the Republic of Uganda 
2004). He argued that the tax should be abolished because it: 
  
(a) was a colonial legacy that continued to haunt the country 
(b) resulted in double taxation since it was not much different from Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) 
(c) made poor people worse off 
(d) was vulnerable to manipulation by politicians 
(e) was regressive  
(f) resulted in riots and even death in some cases 
(g) was rarely used for the benefit of local communities 
(h) was characterised with expensive and coercive enforcement  
(i) made local government dependent on it instead of exploring other revenue sources.  
 
Those supporting the abolition of the tax also noted that Uganda was the only country in East 
Africa that still levied that kind of poll tax. Kenya had long abolished the tax, and Tanzania 
had done so the previous year.  
 
While parliamentarians in Kenya had shown overwhelming support for the abolition of 
graduated personal tax in 1973, the reaction in Uganda’s parliament was mixed, and in fact 
quite split. Out of a total of ninety-three members of parliament, five members abstained from 
voting on the motion, thirty-nine voted against and forty-nine voted in favour of it. Later that 
month, at a caucus meeting of the ruling political party (National Resistance Movement 
(NRM)), the president announced that graduated tax would be suspended for a period of ten 
years starting in FY2005/2006 (Osike 2004). He argued that, given the low income levels of 
most households, it was better to raise revenue from indirect taxes on consumer goods 
instead of taxing the poor through direct taxes. The following month, the vice president of 
Uganda emphasised the fact that the government was suspending – not abolishing – the tax, 
stating that:  
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It should be understood that the tax has not been abolished. It is only being suspended 
for a specific period. … During the next ten years therefore, we need to mobilise our 
people to raise a minimum income of at least Sh10million in each household so that in 
future when the tax is reinstated they are equitably taxed. (Vision Reporter 2004) 
 
This distinction between the initial stance taken by Uganda and that of the other two 
countries is important, because it explains in part why there were calls for the tax to be 
reintroduced ten years later. Before the ten-year period was over, however, in 2008 the 
government of Uganda announced that it was abolishing graduated tax and replacing it with 
two other taxes: the local service tax and local hotel tax (Local Government Finance 
Commission 2012). Since then, there have been calls from civil society organisations,2 
sections of government3 and even the general public (particularly individuals in rural areas) 4 
for the tax to be reintroduced. 
 
 
2  Why was graduated tax suspended in 
Uganda?  
 
There is hardly any debate about the fact that government policy on graduated tax was often 
very political. On numerous occasion, politicians publicly criticised the tax, and sometimes 
even arbitrarily told people that they were exempted from paying it (Local Government 
Finance Commission 2012). Indeed, the debate on whether or not the tax should be 
scrapped was initiated in the context of the highly charged 2001 presidential election 
(Ndawula 2009; Kizza-Besigye 2001; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). In the course of the 
campaign the main opposition candidate, Kizza Besigye, decried the tax as being a colonial 
relic and oppressive to everyday citizens. He promised to scrap it once elected into office. 
This won him support of especially the rural poor, who viewed the tax as oppressive. Amidst 
the threat of losing support from the rural population, which had since 1986 formed the core 
support of President Museveni and the NRM, the latter announced that his government 
would look into a comprehensive reform of the tax once elected in 2001. At the time, he 
promised that the reform would be geared towards ensuring that the enforcement of 
graduated tax was more friendly, and that the tax itself was affordable to everyday citizens. 
Following the 2001 election, the minimum tax payable was reduced from UGX11,000 to 
UGX3,000 per year (Bahiigwa et. al. 2004). Later, in 2004, in the face of what would be 
another heated presidential election in 2006, the president announced that the tax would be 
suspended effective 2005 (Kjaer and Therkilsen 2013). 
 
Graduated tax was defined as ‘a crude form of income tax levied in Uganda upon the entire 
population of able bodied adult males and some women by the District Administration and 
                                                            
2  See, for example, Ismail Musa Ladu, ‘Civil society organisations want graduated tax back’, 
<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Civil-society-organisations-wants-graduated-tax-back/688322-2692868-
oqqrii/index.html>; Ismail Musa Ladu (2016) ‘Government quashes idea of restoring graduated tax’, 
<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/Government-quashes-idea-of-restoring-graduated-tax/688616-3154902-
pttfu2/index.html>; Bernard Busuulwa, ‘Uganda: Proposal for return of graduated tax opposed’, 
<http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Uganda-Proposal-for-return-of-graduated-tax-opposed--/2560-3172218-
ll55cuz/index.html>. 
3  Interviews with researchers in 2016 and 2017.  
4  Ismail Musa Ladu (2016) ‘Government quashes idea of restoring graduated tax’, 
<http://www.monitor.co.ug/Business/Prosper/Government-quashes-idea-of-restoring-graduated-tax/688616-3154902-
pttfu2/index.html>. 
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Urban Authorities where they reside’ (Davey 1974: 31). It was levied on income, actual or 
presumed, from all sources, including land and other assets used for subsistence (Ghai 
1966: 19). It was administered by local authorities under powers conferred by the local 
Government Act (Chap. 243 Laws of Uganda). Assessment of the tax was made by a tax 
assessment committee or assessment officer appointed by the District or Urban Local 
Council for that purpose (Bakibinga 2012: 16-17). Only adults of 18 years of age and above 
residing in the particular area were assessed. Certain persons, including visitors to the 
particular local council, students and diplomatic and consular personnel were exempt from 
payment of the tax (Local Government Act, Fifth Schedule). Allowances were paid to local 
and security officials involved in collection. 
 
Graduated tax had become unpopular for various reasons, and was thus easy to use as 
political bait. First, the tax relied heavily on harsh enforcement. Frequently, particularly in 
rural areas, armed local defence units were used in tax collection; tax defaulters were 
beaten, arrested and sometimes taken to unknown destinations, and in extreme cases 
imprisoned (Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Livingstone and Charlton 1998; interviews with 
officials in Mbarara District Local Council; Parliament of the Government of Uganda 2004). 
Sometimes defaulters slept in bushes at night to hide from tax collectors (interview with local 
government officials in Gulu District). There was at least one report of a tax defaulter being 
beaten to death by tax collectors, and others sustaining injuries from gunshots that were fired 
in the process of collecting taxes (Livingstone and Charlton 1998). Frequently, if not always, 
it was poor people who bore the brunt of the harsh enforcement.5 
 
Second, the tax was regressive (Republic of Uganda 1987). While various tax bands were 
provided for under the law, in practice these bands did not affect the actual tax incidence 
(Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Mugume 2004). A number of factors made the tax 
regressive. To begin with, it was difficult to assess the real income of peasants who relied 
primarily on rain for farming – meaning that they sometimes paid taxes even when their 
harvest had gone bad. Many times, poor people had to sell their land or livestock to fulfil their 
tax obligations (interviews with community members in Butunza and local government 
officials in Gulu District). Additionally, political pressure often obstructed collection, and 
determined who paid taxes. Often the poor paid, while the rich were let off the hook 
(Bahiigwa 2004). 6 Lastly, because of inefficient tax administration, it was fairly accidental 
who ended up paying tax and how much they paid. Many assessments were made in a 
crude and presumptive manner (Therkildsen 2006). In a survey conducted in three districts in 
2001, for example, it was found that households in the lowest quartile paid a share of their 
income that was about three times more than that paid by households in the highest income 
quartile (Bahiigwa 2004). Sometime, individuals earning income at similar levels were taxed 
differently as a result of being in different locations (Therkildsen 2006).7  
                                                            
5  In a survey conducted in 2000 of 56 central government prisons and 139 local government prisons, for example, it was 
found that in central government prisons 79 people were convicted and 304 people (around 5% of all those remanded) 
charged with failure to pay graduated tax (Therkildsen 2006). Most of the inmates were poor people, whose financial 
situation made them unable to pay their taxes to avoid imprisonment, or unable to pay bribes to prison officials for their 
release. The survey also found that 14 of the 74 (19%) individuals convicted received longer sentences than the 
statutory sentence, while 57% received the legal maximum of one month. Only 25% got a shorter sentence than the 
legal maximum.  
6  In Kapchorwa district, for example, there were a sizeable number of successful businessmen, opinion leaders and local 
political leaders and elders whose names were not on the graduated tax register in 1996 (Mukasa 2002). Some of these 
chronic defaulters were as highly placed as local council chairpersons, and members of the district councils and 
committees. Even some of those who appeared on the register stubbornly refused to pay.  
7  Thus, for example, in an analysis of a selection of districts in 1992-1993, it was found that there were great variances in 
the taxes paid in the different districts, and that these variances did not reflect the income levels in those districts 
(Livingstone and Charlton 1998). For example, in Iganga (a comparatively well-off district) it was found that over 50% of 
taxpayers paid UGX4,000 or less in graduated tax, while in Lira (a much poorer district) 86% paid between UGX7,000 
and UGX12,000.  
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Third, there was a widespread sentiment among taxpayers that the taxes collected were not 
used to fund local services. Even though initially there was some evidence of the taxes being 
used to fund projects that benefited local communities, by the early 2000s many felt that the 
revenue collected was mostly used to fund the administrative expenses of local government 
(Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008; Livingston and Charlton 1998). 8  
 
Fourth, and related to the above, there was a general perception among taxpayers that the 
whole process of assessment, collection and use of the tax was riddled with corruption. In 
some cases tax officials were accused of embezzling revenue for personal gain (Kjaer 2009). 
Similarly, local government officials were accused of conniving with taxpayers for the latter to 
pay the least amount of taxes (Mugume 2004). This had a negative impact on tax morale.   
 
To make matters worse, the cost of collecting the tax was often quite high. In a study 
conducted in fifteen higher and twenty-five lower local government institutions, it was 
estimated that on average the collection costs incurred by lower local government institutions 
were 25 per cent of the taxes collected, while higher local government institutions spent 22 
per cent on collection (Development Consultants International Limited 2005). In some 
districts the collection costs would exceed 30 per cent of the taxes collected (Livingstone and 
Charlton 1998).  
 
Fifth, even though graduated tax constituted a significant percentage of the revenue 
collected by local government, its actual contribution to total local government financing was 
quite small. As Table 1 shows, in the late 1990s graduated tax contributed 8 per cent of total 
local government revenue; a figure that dropped significantly to under 2 per cent in 
2004/2005.  
 
Table 1 Sources of local government revenue 1997/98- 2004/059 (UGX billion) 
 
Source: Local Government Finance Commission.10  
 
The combination of the above factors made graduated tax quite unpopular, and the target of 
a number of protests. In 1984, for example, citizens staged protests against the government 
because of a tenfold increase in the tax (Mamdani 2008). In 1994, residents of Iganga, a 
district in the eastern part of Uganda, protested against unfair assessments of graduated tax 
(Kjaer and Therkildsen 2013; Fjeldstad and Therkildsen 2008). Similarly, in 2002 a riot broke 
out at a factory in western Uganda where workers were striking because of over-assessment 
                                                            
8  In an interview with SEATINI officials the researchers were informed that in some cases council meetings alone 
exhausted the revenue that had been collected. In Gulu, expenses such as allowances and fuel for local government 
officials often consumed the taxes that had been collected (interview with local government official in Gulu district).  
9  These figures represent the contribution of graduated tax to total local government revenue including grants from central 
government. 
10  2016 data from draft report on file with LGFC. 
F/Y GTax Other Taxes Grants Other Rev Total Rev GTax Other Taxes Grants Other Rev
1997/98 21.8        19.9             218.5     14.4        274.6     7.9% 7.3% 79.6% 5.2%
1998/99 19.8        20.6             319.3     16.0        375.7     5.3% 5.5% 85.0% 4.3%
1999/00 17.1        22.7             392.8     17.5        450.1     3.8% 5.0% 87.3% 3.9%
2000/01 15.5        20.2             513.2     23.4        572.3     2.7% 3.5% 89.7% 4.1%
2001/02 25.5        13.7             624.8     24.5        688.5     3.7% 2.0% 90.7% 3.6%
2002/03 29.8        13.7             705.6     27.2        776.3     3.8% 1.8% 90.9% 3.5%
2003/04 29.5        12.1             728.1     29.5        799.2     3.7% 1.5% 91.1% 3.7%
2004/05 16.1        31.8             848.9     31.6        928.4     1.7% 3.4% 91.4% 3.4%
Local government Revenue Revenue Share (%)
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of graduated tax (Parliament of Uganda 2002). One person was shot dead and two others 
were wounded.  
 
Yet, despite all these factors, ten years after its suspension certain factions in the population 
were calling for reintroduction of the tax. One of the things we sought to understand was: 
what explained the apparent nostalgia for a tax that had been largely unpopular? Even more 
intriguing, why would a segment of the population that often bore the brunt of enforcement – 
directly or indirectly – yearn for reintroduction of the same tax? We answer these questions 
in the next section.  
 
 
3  What explains calls for the reintroduction of 
graduated tax?  
 
There are various similarities in the events surrounding the abolition of graduated tax and 
development levy in Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. In all three countries the taxes were 
abolished close to presidential elections (Kenya National Assembly 1973; Kjaer and 
Therkildsen 2013). In Tanzania and Uganda, we were able to trace opposition to abolition of 
the tax from some segments within government, particularly local government officials in both 
countries and some members of parliament in Uganda (World Bank 2006). In Kenya, 
however, the minister’s proposal to abolish the tax was met with great enthusiasm in 
parliament, with members observing that the tax was unfair, regressive and that it was often 
used to oppress those that tax collectors had grudges against (Kenya National Assembly 
1973). Despite these similarities, it is only in Uganda that there has been a public debate 
inside and outside government about whether graduated tax should be reintroduced. The 
immediate explanation for this could be the fact that originally the Government of Uganda 
announced that it was suspending, rather than abolishing, the tax. It is thus no wonder that 
ten years after the announcement the debate was revived. However, this explanation on its 
own is insufficient – particularly given the fact that the government later (in 2008) abolished 
the tax and replaced it with the local services tax and local hotel tax.  
 
We find two explanations for the nostalgia for graduated tax. The first is not entirely 
surprising. Subnational government officials calling for reintroduction of the tax complain that 
graduated tax was the main source of locally generated revenue, and there has been no 
adequate replacement since its abolition. The second origin of the call to reintroduce the tax 
is somewhat surprising, because it comes from a segment of the population that often bore 
the brunt of the tax – directly and/or indirectly. It is the nostalgia of men and women in rural 
Uganda. For this group, graduated tax was a symbol of pride and encouraged productivity. 
We discuss these explanations in detail below. 
 
3.1 Absence of a viable alternative to graduated tax  
 
Graduated tax was the major source of locally generated revenue for many subnational 
governments. According to the LGFC, at the time it was scrapped revenue from graduated 
tax constituted 66 per cent of all subnational government own source revenue. The abolition 
of the tax is also reported to have created an immediate revenue shortfall of UGX60 billion 
(Local Government Finance Commission 2012). This was exacerbated by inadequate 
compensation for it from central government, and the poor performance of the local services 
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and local hotel taxes that had been introduced to replace it and effectively provide alternative 
revenue, particularly in rural areas. This left many subnational governments with hardly any 
revenue; this situation has been exacerbated by the ever-insufficient fiscal transfers from the 
central government.  
 
As Table 2 below shows, urban councils were even more affected by the abolition of 
graduated tax, since most of them depended highly on revenue collection from graduated 
tax. In 1996/97, for example, councils such as Bombo, Bushenyi and Mpigi collected 
between 44 per cent and 53 per cent of their revenue from graduated tax, and did not rely on 
any funding from the central government.  
 
Table 2 Analysis of total revenue from 17 urban councils 1996/97 and 1997/98 
 
Source: Analysis of Districts and Urban Councils Budgets for 1996/97_1997/98 by Ministry of Local Government. 
 
After graduated tax was abolished, the government announced three main initiatives to fill 
the revenue gap: a graduated tax compensation scheme, two new local government taxes 
(local service tax and local hotel tax), and a 1 per cent increase in the rate of VAT.  
 
The graduated tax compensation scheme was introduced shortly after suspension of 
graduated tax to compensate local government for the revenue that it had lost (Local 
Government Finance Commission 2012). However, by 2011/2012 the scheme was paying 
out less than a third of what had been budgeted. In municipalities such as Mbarara, the 
scheme ran for a period of five years, after which it was abruptly stopped (interview with 
officials in Mbarara Municipality). In Kabale, where the district used to collect approximately 
UGX3 billion annually in graduated tax, the compensation scheme provided only UGX1.6 
billion, which was also abruptly stopped (interview with local government official in Kabale 
district). In the end, local government was left with inadequate compensation.  
 
To replace graduated tax, in 2008 the government introduced a local service tax and local 
hotel tax. Local service tax is imposed on all persons earning an income from employment or 
self-employment. Local hotel tax is imposed on occupants of hotel rooms. At the time of their 
introduction, it was estimated that the two taxes would contribute approximately UGX67 
billion to local government revenue (CSBAG 2017). However, by 2011/2012 the two taxes 
combined were raising only about UGX6 billion annually (Local Government Finance 
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Commission 2012). In practice, local service tax has been imposed mostly on those in formal 
employment (interviews with officials in Mbarara District Local Council and Kabale 
Municipality). Essentially, the bulk of these individuals are government employees and 
employees of big companies where tax is withheld from employment income and remitted to 
local government. Most other individuals remain untaxed. Local government officials in 
Mbarara, Kabale, Tororo and Kapchorwa informed the researchers that it is difficult to collect 
local service tax and local hotel tax even from some businesses in the formal sector, 
because many of them resort to keeping two separate books of account. In Tororo, for 
example, one large company was found to be keeping two payroll records: one for the 
purpose of remitting Pay As You Earn (PAYE) to the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), and 
another less populated one for the purposes of local service tax. Similarly, some hotel 
owners keep separate books of account: one to share with security organisations (which 
often contain a more comprehensive list), and another to share with local government 
(having fewer names of hotel occupants). The other challenge with the local hotel tax is that 
it mainly benefits urban local councils. Most rural areas lack hotel infrastructure (interview 
with local government officials in Mbarara, Kabale, Gulu, Moroto, Tororo and Kapchorwa).  
 
The other initiative that the government announced when it abolished graduated tax was that 
it would increase the rate of VAT from 17 per cent to 18 per cent, with the 1 per cent increase 
being earmarked for local government transfers (Local Government Finance Commission 
2012). The Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development projected that this 
increase would result in an additional UGX153 billion in VAT. The researchers were not able 
to establish whether this increase was realised. What is certain, however, is the fact that the 
1 per cent was never earmarked for local government transfers. In an interview with officials 
in the Ministry of Finance, the officials explained that the Ministry understood that the 
abolition of the tax was going to place an additional burden on central government to support 
local government. However, they confirmed that the 1 per cent was never specifically 
earmarked for this.  
 
As at 2012, locally generated revenue constituted less than 5 per cent of total financing of 
local government budgets (Local Government Finance Commission 2012). This contribution 
is much lower when specific district budgets are analysed. In Kabale, for example, locally 
generated revenue constitutes only 1 per cent of the district budget (interviews with officials 
in Kabale District). In Mbarara, Kisoro and Gulu, the contributions are 2 per cent, less than 2 
per cent and less than 1 per cent respectively (interviews with local government officials in 
the respective districts). Table 3 below represents a summary of all local government 
revenue after the abolition of graduated tax.  
 
Table 3 Local government revenue after abolition of graduated tax (UGX billion)  
 
Source: Local Government Finance Commission.11  
 
                                                            
11  2016 data from draft report on file with LGFC. 
F/Y LST LHT Other Taxes Grants Other Rev Total Rev LST LHT Other Taxes Grants Other Rev Own Rev Total LG Rev
2008/09 3.8          1.0          24.9             1,211.2  89.0        1,329.9  0.3% 0.1% 1.9% 91.1% 6.7% 4.1% 0.4%
2009/10 9.2          1.5          45.6             1,410.3  86.5        1,553.1  0.6% 0.1% 2.9% 90.8% 5.6% 7.5% 0.7%
2010/11 6.5          0.9          31.6             1,586.7  72.0        1,697.7  0.4% 0.1% 1.9% 93.5% 4.2% 6.7% 0.4%
2011/12 7.1          1.2          29.3             1,783.8  80.0        1,901.3  0.4% 0.1% 1.5% 93.8% 4.2% 7.0% 0.4%
2012/13 10.8        1.1          33.6             1,925.8  93.9        2,065.2  0.5% 0.1% 1.6% 93.3% 4.5% 8.5% 0.6%
2013/14 10.1        1.3          38.7             2,168.4  102.9     2,321.4  0.4% 0.1% 1.7% 93.4% 4.4% 7.4% 0.5%
2014/15 11.7        2.9          45.1             2,448.0  117.6     2,625.2  0.4% 0.1% 1.7% 93.2% 4.5% 8.2% 0.6%
Average 7.4          1.2          0.4% 0.1% 2.1% 92.8% 4.7% 7.1% 0.5%
LST & LHT (Combined) - %Local government Revenue Revenue Share (% of Total LG Financing)
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This situation has been exacerbated by the recent creation of new districts. In 1992, when 
decentralisation was introduced in Uganda, there were thirty-nine districts (Steiner 2007). By 
2006/2007 the number of districts had increased to seventy-nine (Green 2008). At the time of 
writing this paper, there were 112 districts (Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2014). Generally, 
local government in Uganda can be loosely categorised as local government in rural areas 
and local government in urban areas. In rural areas, the local authority structure consists of 
districts and sub-county councils. In urban areas, the local authority comprises either the city, 
municipality or town councils, depending on the size (Livingstone and Charlton 2001). The 
creation of districts is in most cases politically motivated with no rationale criteria. For 
instance, counties have been converted into districts. The creation of a new district resulted 
in the creation of at least two new urban local councils (Local Government Finance 
Commission 2012). 
 
Most taxable economic activities are found in urban councils, where local government can 
collect taxes on property, trading licences and market fees from well-established markets. 
District councils, in particular, are at a disadvantage because they have limited sources of 
revenue when compared to urban and town councils (interview with former official of Kabale 
Municipality). In Mbarara district, for example, as a result of the creation of new district 
administrative centres, taxes such as the local service tax and local hotel tax are now 
administered by town councils and municipalities, leaving districts with very few taxable 
activities (interview with officials in Mbarara District). Similarly, rural parts of Mbarara, such 
as Kashari north, Kashari south and Rwampara, have no hotels. While town councils like 
Kabale are able to collect local hotel tax, given the fact that they are financially and 
administratively autonomous from the district, this tax is not remitted to the district. Similar 
challenges were cited in Gulu, Kisoro and Tororo districts. As seen below, the share of taxes 
to rural local government has decreased, while that to urban local government has 
increased.  
 
Table 4 Rural urban revenue trends (UGX million) 
Level of administration 2008/2009  2009/2010  2010/2011  
Town councils 9,954,395 21,350,255 27,755,332 
Municipalities 10,031,655 25,110,523 32,643,680 
Districts 72,892,984 54,201,609 56,911,689 
Total 92,879,034 100,662,387 117,310,701 
Share of rural LGs (%) 78% 54% 49% 
Share of urban councils 22% 46% 51% 
Source: Local Government Finance Commission 2012. 
 
For most rural local government, this means increased reliance on central government to 
fund their budgets. As at 2012, transfers from central government to local government had 
on average increased to more than 85 per cent of local government funding (Local 
Government Commission 2012). The bulk of this funding is conditional, meaning that local 
government has little or no discretion over how to spend the money (Ndawula 2009). 
 
While it has often been argued that graduated tax (particularly after the 1990s) rarely funded 
public services, this was not the case for all local governments. In some instances, part of 
the revenue realised from graduated tax was used to fund important public programmes, 
especially in the health and education sectors (Local Government Finance Commission 
2012). Some local government officials maintain that the revenue raised was invested in 
projects that benefited their communities (interviews with officials in the Local Government 
Finance Commission). In Mbarara district, for example, 25 per cent of the tax collected was 
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often returned to the villages to support building of schools, provide water, construct roads 
and fund local council courts (interview with official in Mbarara District Local Council). In 
Kabale, 65 per cent of graduated tax revenue was retained in the district to enable sub-
counties to construct local government staff houses, top up allowances of health workers, 
and facilitate the construction and operation of local courts and sports activities (interviews 
with officials from Kabale District Local Government). Ultimately, the argument that 
graduated tax was used only to fund operational costs and/or was embezzled by public 
officials is not sustainable in every local government, and it is important that a distinction is 
drawn between local government that used it to benefit their communities, and those that did 
not. In areas where revenue from graduated tax was used to the benefit of the population, its 
reinstatement is supported by both the technocrats in local government and sections of the 
community (interviews with local government officials and focus group discussions in Kabale, 
Mbarara and Tororo). 
 
What explains the desire of Uganda’s subnational governments to have the tax reinstated 
when compared to their counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania? After all, graduated tax was 
the major source of own revenue in all three countries. We argue that the explanation lies – 
at least in part – in the countries’ histories of decentralisation more generally. In Kenya 
decentralisation has often been a contentious issue, with some ruling parties (such as the 
Kenya African National Union) being more in favour of a strong central government (World 
Bank 1992). In 1996, the government of Kenya established a Local Government Commission 
to look into ways in which subnational government systems could be strengthened. The 
commission recommended various reforms. The government endorsed many of the reforms 
and committed to supporting the revitalisation of local authorities through the provision of 
reliable sources of revenue and central government grants. However, in 1969 parliament 
passed the Transfer of Function Act, which had the effect of transferring the responsibility for 
major services such as primary education and health from local authorities to central 
government (with the exception of seven of the largest municipalities). Following this the 
administration of graduated tax was transferred to the central government, until it was finally 
abolished. This would explain, at least in part, why there was not much opposition in 
parliament to its abolition. For a long time it had been administered by the Ministry of 
Finance, and its abolition ceased to be a problem for subnational government as long as the 
latter continued to fund major local government services.  
 
Similarly, Fjeldstad and Therkildsen (2008) argue that while the abolition of the poll tax in 
Tanzania in 1969 was largely premised on the fact that the tax was coercive in nature, there 
was also a political explanation. Specifically, the ruling party at the time was concerned about 
local political elites and cooperatives using subnational government to enhance their 
personal interests. Shortly after the poll tax was abolished, in 1972, rural local authorities 
were disbanded. Urban councils were abolished one year later. The local government 
system was reintroduced in 1982, and the development levy was reintroduced in 1984. This 
new tax was contentiously opposed in parliament and passed with a margin of only two 
votes. By the time it was abolished in 2003, its contribution to total local revenue had 
significantly reduced. Here again, one can conclude that the apparent absence of a call for 
the reintroduction of the tax from subnational government officials may have something to do 
with the historically fragile nature of the country’s local government institutional structures.  
  
3.2 Graduated tax as a symbol of pride and productivity 
 
Many of the individuals who want the reintroduction of graduated tax are in rural areas. For 
most of them, this nostalgia revolves around issues of gender and productivity. It is both 
17 
 
about the perception that men have of themselves and how women perceive them. Many of 
the men who are nostalgic about the tax are the older generation. Their attitude cannot be 
explained on grounds of rationale self-interest. A more plausible explanation is the social 
standing that was associated with being able to honour one’s taxpaying obligations. They 
recall the sense of pride and patriotism that was associated with possessing a tax receipt 
(interviews with officials in the Local Government Finance Commission and with community 
members in Kabale, Mbarara, Gulu, Moroto, Tororo and Kapchorwa Districts). In Gulu, for 
example, when men got together for social gatherings, they often compared their tax receipts 
to establish who had paid more taxes. Proof of payment was a symbol of good standing in 
the community. Similarly, the number of graduated tax tickets one had was associated with 
their age, maturity and sense of responsibility, all of which are important attributes among 
African communities. More specifically, those with the most paid tickets were considered 
elders, and commanded a lot of respect from their peers (focus group discussions in Kabale, 
Kisoro, Mbarara, and interviews with local government officials in Tororo).  
 
Among the pastoral communities in Mbarara, where respect and wealth was derived from the 
number of cows kept in your kraal, prosperous farmers demanded to pay the highest 
possible assessment – UGX100,000. To them, paying less was to place themselves in the 
less privileged and unenviable class of ‘mediocre’ farmers. Thus, in these pastoral 
communities, the more taxes they paid, the more respect they were accorded (interview with 
official from Mbarara District local government). For this segment of the population, the 
abolition of the tax took away one of the instruments that was used to show standing in 
society.  
 
Women who would like the reintroduction of the tax do so on the grounds that it compelled 
their men to be productive (interview with SEATINI officials). Men had to go to work because 
they had an obligation to pay taxes. The increased productivity meant that they could provide 
for their families and, in certain cases, even save some money (interview with officials in the 
Local Government Finance Commission). Engaging in productive activities also meant that 
there was less crime. Some argued that the tax created harmony between husbands and 
wives, because they worked closely together to achieve the objective of paying taxes 
(interview with official in Mbarara District Local Council). Sometimes women would pay the 
tax on behalf of their men, and keep the tax receipts until the men refunded their money 
(interview with official in Kyanamira sub-county, Kabale District).12 When the proposal to 
abolish graduated tax was made in parliament in 2004, the member of parliament for Arua (a 
woman) said:  
 
I would like to inform my colleagues that in Arua the Graduated Tax you are saying is 
gender insensitive has been shifted to the women to pay for their husbands … The 
women of Arua have been paying Graduated Tax for their husbands. During the time of 
collection, because of harassment, the men normally go to sleep in the ceilings, so it is 
their wives to pay the Graduated Tax so that their husbands are not arrested. 
(Parliament of the Government of Uganda 2004).  
 
Women in districts such as Lamwo have called for the reintroduction of the tax because they 
complain that since it was abolished many of their men are no longer interested in working 
(interview with SEATINI officials). Similarly, in a focus group discussion that we held in 
Bugongi, Kabale district, the women stated that they wanted graduated tax reintroduced 
because ever since it was abolished the men in the community had become lazy and were 
                                                            
12  See also Mucunguzi, J., ‘Bakiga women pay tax for husbands’, The Monitor 25 July 1997.  
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no longer providing for their households. It was also reported that the lack of pressure to pay 
taxes has resulted in many young men spending most of their time consuming alcohol 
(interview with official in Kabale District). This has in turn increased the cases of domestic 
violence.  
 
The impact of the abolition of the tax on men’s productivity has been exacerbated by the fact 
that the government subsidises a number of services, such as the provision of universal 
primary education and universal secondary education (interview with officials in the Local 
Government Finance Commission). By taking away the bulk of the financial burden for 
funding an education, there is less pressure on men to work. At the same time, irrespective 
of the provision of subsidised primary and secondary school education, some argue that the 
abolition of graduated tax increased the rate of school drop-outs and idleness, particularly 
among male youths (interview with subcounty officials in Bukinda, Kabale District). Students 
were exempt from paying graduated tax. This had the positive impact of keeping them in 
school to avoid having a tax liability. Its abolition means that those who were not keen on 
studying dropped out of school.  
 
It is important to understand this gendered argument in the context of the rural setting, where 
most families are able to access food from their land because they engage in peasant 
farming. Most work on the land is done by women and children. Graduated tax compelled 
men to go out and earn an income to avoid being arrested. Whether or not a tax should be 
used to serve this purpose is a question beyond the scope of this paper. What cannot be 
ignored is the fact that it did in many ways serve that purpose, and that women felt that they 
benefited from it. In particular, having men work in this manner eased their burden of being 
both household caretaker and the provider. It also reduced the time available for men to 
engage in gambling and consumption of alcohol, both of which were often detrimental to 
women’s welfare. 
 
While one may argue that the women’s sentiments are part of a larger problem of the 
tensions existing between men and women, even in the absence of a tax, there is at least 
some history to suggest that this particular tax was introduced to compel people to work in 
the cash economy. As noted in the preceding discussion, poll taxes were introduced in 
Uganda in 1905 to compel Africans to work so that they could support the protectorate 
government through the payment of taxes (Davey 1974). Some have argued, for example, 
that because it was difficult for colonialists to coerce Africans into doing things that were 
beneficial to colonies (such as construction of the railway in East Africa), they introduced 
taxation so the Africans were either forced to seek employment from colonial masters or farm 
their lands so that they could pay the taxes (Parliament of the Republic of Uganda 2004).13 In 
2004, when the abolition of graduated tax was being discussed in Uganda’s parliament, one 
member stated:  
 
The threat of taking the household husband to prison if he did not pay tax was so 
effective that by 3 o’clock the wife was the one who used to wake the husband. ‘Let us 
go and grow cotton so that you are able to gain our freedom, otherwise if you go away 
where are we going to live?’ 
 
                                                            
13  While the view that taxes served the purpose of compelling Africans to work may be partly correct, political scientists 
argue that in every natural state there is reluctance to work. In such societies, therefore, taxes serve the purpose of 
compelling people to work in order to meet their obligation to the state. It is therefore most likely that the tax would have 
had the same effect in developed countries as we know them today during the time that they were in their primitive 
stage. For literature on natural state generally see North (2009). 
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4  Conclusion 
 
The story of the abolition of graduated tax is rather more complex than is sometimes 
suggested. Our research reveals that, while the tax was unpopular for various reasons, there 
are segments of the population for which it had positive attributes. For some women, the tax 
created incentives for men to work, thereby having a positive impact on gender relations 
more broadly. For some men, particularly the older generation, it was about the social 
standing in the community that was associated with being able to honour one’s tax 
obligations. Similarly, it encouraged students, who were exempt from the tax, to stay in 
school.  
 
It is notable from our findings that women have been vocal in advocating for the revival of the 
tax primarily to induce their spouses to participate in gainful employment, thereby avoiding 
idleness and unsocial habits such as alcoholism and gambling. Additionally, this would ease 
the women’s responsibilities both as household caretaker and provider. 
 
It should also be remembered that opposition to the abolition of graduated tax among rural 
communities is not new. In an inquiry into Uganda’s local government system in the late 
1980s, the commissioners to the inquiry noted that several citizens (mainly peasants) were 
overwhelmingly opposed to the abolition of graduated tax (Republic of Uganda 1987). Their 
objections were based on two main grounds. First, they felt that if the tax was abolished and 
replaced with an indirect tax, they would not be able to ascertain how much tax was being 
collected from them. Second, that the indirect tax could turn out to be more regressive.  
 
However, given the political sensitiveness of the tax, it is highly unlikely that the government 
will reintroduce it. This means that the way forward is for local government to maximise the 
potential of existing taxes. For taxes such as the local service tax and local hotel tax, our 
research reveals that part of the problem lies in implementation, which emanates from 
insufficient information. One of the ways in which this problem can be resolved is for local 
government to work closely with central government agencies such as the URA to share 
taxpayer information. Collaboration between the URA and local government has already 
started in districts such as Kampala, where the Kampala Capital City Authority and URA are 
working jointly on the Taxpayer Registration Expansion Project to register as many taxpayers 
as possible. Other local governments should consider introducing similar initiatives. 
 
Another prospect for increasing locally generated revenue, particularly for urban local 
councils, is to put more effort into collecting property taxes. In Tanzania, for example, when 
the development levy was abolished local government intensified collection from taxes that 
existed in law but had not been previously enforced to make up for the revenue lost (World 
Bank 2006). Among these were property taxes, plying fees and parking fees. Existing 
research shows that property taxes have great revenue potential for local government in 
developing countries, but this potential is rarely tapped into (Goodfellow 2015; Jibao and 
Prichard 2013). 
 
Yet, more critically, it is important to ask the question: has fiscal decentralisation in Uganda 
failed so far because of the inherent absence of a tax base at the subnational level, or is it 
due to an underlying lack of commitment to decentralisation generally? More specifically, 
why does subnational government in Uganda continue to struggle to raise own revenue 
despite the vast amount of resources that both donors and governments have sunk into 
projects targeting fiscal independence? Could the explanation be, as has been argued by 
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various scholars elsewhere, that national governments – or at least the politicians who run 
them – do not want fiscally independent subnational governments? Smoke and Lewis (1996) 
begin their analysis of this dilemma by observing that:  
 
The recent history of public sector decentralisation in developing countries is primarily 
a story of disappointing performance or outright failure. With few exceptions, the 
literature is full of stories about extensive and costly fiscal decentralisation programmes 
that have made only limited progress in meeting their stated goals. 
 
They conclude that one explanation for the failure of fiscal decentralisation is the fear of 
central government ministries that they will lose their powers to subnational government. 
Elsewhere, Khemani (2015) argues that ‘partial decentralisation’, characterised by huge 
reliance of subnational government on grants from national government, can be explained by 
the need of central government-level politicians to keep subnational government fiscally 
dependent on them so that they can use the relationship to get votes or otherwise exercise 
political control.14 In other words, by creating subnational government that has ‘low capacity, 
almost no access to own tax bases, and spending and decision-making powers restricted to 
the administering of higher-tier grants for local infrastructure’, those in power are able to 
target grants to particular interest groups in exchange for political support (Khemani 2015). 
This argument also finds support in Green (2010), who argues that, in countries such as 
Uganda, the creation of new subnational units (and particularly the explosion of districts) can 
be attributed to the use of decentralisation as a tool of patronage.  
 
We observed in Section 3 that when decentralisation was introduced in Uganda in 1992, 
there were thirty-nine districts. This has since increased to 112 districts. This fragmentation 
has drastically eroded the tax base of some subnational governments, and invariably 
increased their reliance on grants from central government. Even if the performance of 
property taxes is to be improved, this will benefit only a few urban local governments. The 
majority will continue to rely on central government. Without critically addressing the 
relationship between politics at the national level and the creation of new subnational 
governments, fiscal decentralisation is likely to remain a mere aspiration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                            
14  The authors note, for example, that in a number of African, Latin American, South and East Asian countries, more than 
90% of subnational government expenditure is financed by grants from national governments. Similarly, partial 
decentralisation is characterised by an increasing fragmentation of local government units.  
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